The Syria War Will Not Be a Quagmire — Because Putin and Assad Are Winning

BEIRUT — Late in the night on Feb. 2, the news hit: “all communication and supply line[s]” between Turkey and Aleppo had been severed, according to a Elijah Magnier, a renowned Arab war correspondent with Alrai Media Group. It seems to be so: the Syrian army and allied militias, backed by Hezbollah and Russian air power, took control of a tendril of territory that cuts off Aleppo-based rebels from the Turkish border. See the map below. Eastern supply lines for the so-called Islamic State appear to have also been cut.

Of particular strategic importance is the village of Murassat Khan and adjacent towns north of Aleppo: by taking control of the area, Damascus ended the main Turkey-Aleppo insurgent supply line. The tourniquet around Aleppo can be pulled off the city — and at the same time, one of the main ISIS oil corridors to Turkey is cut. If things proceed as they have been, with the regime advancing further into rebel-held territory, the red swathe of Syrian government forces will shortly expand to encircle all opposition forces (predominantly Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS), who themselves have been encircling Aleppo in the east.

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Map courtesy of Syria Direct.

Edward Dark, a pseudonym for a respected commentator on Syrian affairs living in Aleppo, tweeted on Feb. 3, “This is the beginning of the end of jihadi presence in Aleppo. After 4 years of war & terror, people can finally see the end in sight.”

But if we were to step back and take a look at more of Syria, as shown in the (slightly older) map below, a bigger picture emerges.

Take a close look at the map below. The yellow area purports to represent territory controlled by Syrian Kurds. In reality, “control” is not an appropriate word. But the territory in yellow nevertheless can be said to be friendly to the Syrian army. The People’s Protection Units (a group of mostly Kurdish militias known by the acronym YPG) are being given Russian air support (and sometimes American air support as well). The Afrin canton (the yellow area in Syria’s northwest corner) is the area through which the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency supply line to rebel coalitions, along the Mount Turkmen heights, reportedly used to run. The Latakia region is now in the process of being sealed.

If government forces, moving north, can make friendly contact with the Kurds in the northeast, almost all Nusra and allied rebel forces would be nearly surrounded. The insurgents would be caught in a cauldron with their backs to a lightly populated and forested territory.

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The grey, ISIS-controlled corridor, especially the Jarablus border crossing with Turkey, remains effectively open. Turkey has proclaimed this represents its “red line.” Were this corridor to be closed by the Syrian Kurds, the Turks have indicated they could respond by invading Syria. The YPG say nonetheless, that they are contemplating just such a move.

In the last few days, the spokesman for the Russian defense ministry warned that Russia has seen clear evidence of Turkish preparations for a military invasion of Syria. It seems likely that this statement is intended by Russia as a warning to Turkey to do no such thing.

Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made it absolutely clear (to Turkey and to everyone else) that Russia intends to close the border area between ISIS-held territory and Turkey: “The key point for the ceasefire to work is a task of blocking illegal trafficking across the Turkish-Syrian border, which supports the militants,” he said. “Without closing the border it is difficult to expect the ceasefire to take place.” Russia is politely telling Turkey that any incursion risks direct confrontation and war. Recently, for whatever reason, ISIS forces have appeared to start pulling out of that area.

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Lavrov in Oman on Feb. 3. (Alexander ShcherbakTASS via Getty Images)

With Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan being the irascible character that he is, it is possible that we may yet see surprises, like a Turkish incursion into northern Syria aimed — ostensibly — at preventing the Syrian Kurds from linking up along the southern side of the Turkish border. But, if Turkey were to take such independent action, it would likely forfeit any NATO support beyond rhetoric, and any Turkish expeditionary force would have to be launched in the face of Russia’s complete air superiority in Syria, which extends right up to the Turkish border.

To discourage Turkey from taking such a rash undertaking, however, Russia reportedly deployed several of its latest advanced fighter jets to Syria (which easily outclass Turkish F-16s) and also repaired and upgraded the Syrian air force’s line up.

To put it baldly then, as things stand, Syria seems to be heading not towards a “quagmire” as many western politicians have suggested, but rather to a clear military outcome. As one knowledgable commentator noted, the negotiating table is not in Geneva. The true negotiations are taking place on the battlefields of Idlib and Aleppo — and what has just been negotiated is the near encirclement of rebel forces into a cauldron.

Nor, it seems, is Syria heading toward a low-intensity guerrilla war in the aftermath of any military victory on the ground. The scenes below, showing people’s jubilation when the Syrian Army and Hezbollah forces entered villages that had been retaken from rebel forces this week, tell a different story:

Pics: jubilation in Shia towns Nibol & Zahra N. Aleppo as #Syria army & Hezbollah arrive to lift 3 year jihadi siege pic.twitter.com/6gtZmyuG1Z

— Edward Dark (@edwardedark) February 4, 2016

Put simply, should Nusra members (who are mainly Syrian) and other rebels try to disperse and hide amongst local communities, there will be no water in which these fish can swim, to paraphrase the Maoist adage. They will find little or no public support. Syria has a very effective intelligence service. We may expect that within a year, most of the disbanded jihadists will have been found out and reported to the intelligence services by locals, who suffered grievously under their occupation. Most will be arrested or killed.

Peoples who undergo the kind of trauma to which Syrians have been subjected either emerge as a psychologically defeated nation or they are strengthened by the crisis through which they have passed. I am quite sure from my visits to Syria through this crisis that its people will emerge stronger. Steel has entered into the Syrian soul.

I also expect Syria to soon again constitute a strong regional state. The meaning of this will be evidenced in a powerful, cohesive northern arc through the region — and perhaps closer relations with Iraq. Correspondingly, certain Gulf states will find themselves eclipsed.

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A civil defense team member stands on the debris of a building after a suspected Russian airstrike in Aleppo, Syria on Feb. 5, 2016. (Firas Taki/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)

American and many European elites will find this outcome hard to swallow. Western diplomats and military officers have become more used to quagmires that lead to no political outcomes, or to fudges that lead to stasis, rather than interventions that have a real conclusion. That this should have been achieved with direct help from Russia, Iran and Hezbollah will be a bitter pill to swallow. It will have consequences too.

One is already apparent. The Obama administration announced this week it would ask Congress to quadruple its security assistance to Europe. Polarization seems to be on the cards. The 4+1 coalition (Syria, Iraq, Iran, Russia and Hezbollah) is likely to become the core to a real security architecture for parts of the Middle East — and probably Central Asia too. China will increasingly be drawn into this new architecture as well, since it fears that its “One Belt, One Road” project, on which its economic future largely is staked, is as vulnerable to Wahhabism as was Syria and Iraq. Chinese officials, I’ve been told, are aware that America could again use the Wahhabist tool to frustrate their new project.

The question is, will the bitterness at Syria, Russia and Iran’s achievement poison America and Europe’s attitude towards the new security architecture being forged in Syria? Will it be seen as anti-Western (which it is not), or will Europe manage to curb the Pavlovian NATO impulses sufficiently to establish some modus vivendi? The auguries are not promising.

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America Is Dramatically Changing its Syria Policy. Here’s Why.

BEIRUT — It seems it Washington has decided that trying to corner Russia is a bad idea.

Rather than show President Vladimir Putin as a weak paper tiger and as a hopelessly inadequate, flawed model of alternative leadership — John Kerry has had to warn President Obama that the U.S. has been skirting dangerously close to the possibility of accidental hostilities breaking out with Russia, which would run the risk of becoming real war.

There have been a number of important issues that Moscow has signaled as potential breakpoints to hostilities, yet chosen not to air extensively in the public domain. The first was Turkey’s ambush of a Russan jet over Syria. Its operational flight plan had been passed to the Americans, as part of the Russian-U.S. deconfliction procedures. (Also: the downed Russian plane carried no air-to-air missile defense).

Turkey is, of course, both a member of the America-led anti-Islamic State coalition and a NATO member. Putin said explicitly that he had some hard questions to put to his partners about how the Russian jet’s flight plan had been treated by the Americans — and also on Obama’s complete lack of criticism for Turkey’s action and NATO’s unqualified backing for Turkey.

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Syrian President Bashar al-Assad speaks with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin (R) at the Kremlin in October. (ALEXEY DRUZHININ/AFP/Getty Images)

Did this, in some way, imply America was an accomplice to or had green lit the action? Sergey Lavrov has also challenged the U.S. and Turkey on whether the attack on the Russian jet meant that the U.S. and Turkey intended to protect ISIS’ oil pipeline through Idlib to Turkey, and also whether they wished to ring-fence what looks like a CIA logistics line run by Turkmen groups through Mount Turkmen in Syria to jihadist forces?

The third hard question for the Americans from the Russians was the air attack on a Syrian army base near Deir ez-Zour, which, apart from killing and wounding four Syrian Army personnel, led to this strategic position being seized by ISIS. America had two aircraft in the vicinity, and Russia acknowledged that they were not involved in the strike. But Russia also asserted that there were other U.S.-led coalition aircraft over Deir ez-Zour at the time and implied that they were responsible for the attack — and that it was a deliberate act in support of ISIS. Why had America deliberately declined to acknowledge these other coalition aircraft were in the vicinity, Russian officials wanted to know.

We have no account of what transpired in Moscow during Kerry’s Tuesday visit, but it is hard to believe that Putin and his team would not have told the Americans bluntly that if matters continued in this fashion, the two powers — whether inadvertently or not — would soon be coming head to head militarily, and that the consequences would be grave. That Putin and his colleagues were of this (troubled and angry) state of mind is clear from two formal and public Russian statements made prior to Kerry’s visit.

Putin told his military commanders: “Any targets threatening the Russian groups of forces or land infrastructure must be immediately destroyed.”

This was followed shortly after by an equally disturbing statement by Putin to the Russian defense ministry board:

“Special attention must be paid to strengthening the combat potential of the strategic nuclear forces and implementing defense space programs. It is necessary, as outlined in our plans, to equip all components of the nuclear triad with new arms.”

Any defence ministry would understand immediately: Putin had just placed the nuclear gun on the table.

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John Kerry addresses a joint press conference with Russia’s foreign minister at the Kremlin. (MANDEL NGAN/AFP/Getty Images)

In any event, the White House must have got the message because at Tuesday’s press conference in Moscow, Kerry said: “The United States and our partners are not seeking so-called regime change.” He added that the focus is no longer “on our differences about what can or cannot be done immediately about Assad.”

“In a testament to the fact that mainstream media is beginning to understand just how weak America’s negotiating position has become,” one leading U.S. financial site noted, the “AP offered the following rather sarcastic assessment: ‘President Barack Obama first called on Assad to leave power in the summer of 2011, with “Assad must go” being a consistent rallying cry. Later, American officials allowed that he wouldn’t have to resign on “Day One” of a transition. Now, no one can say when Assad might step down.'”

Kerry also called demands by the “moderate” opposition that Assad step down before peace negotiations begin a “nonstarter.”

If Kerry’s words reflect a genuine shift in the U.S. position, this is very significant. And there is reason to think that there may finally have been an outcome to the longstanding and bitter conflict in Washington between those saying that Assad’s ouster was both a necessary and sufficient condition for ending the conflict in Syria, and “those advisers who feel that demanding Assad’s ouster is holding back broader efforts to defeat the Islamic State,” as Josh Rogin put it.

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Smoke rises after shelling by the Syrian army in Jobar, Damascus, Syria. (Alexander Kots/Komsomolskaya Pravda via AP)

More crucially than the endless chicken and egg argument in Washington over whether or not Assad’s departure would puncture the balloon of Wahhabist jihadism is that Washington may be coming to the understanding that neither Russia nor Iran nor Hezbollah believe for one second the U.S. narrative that if Assad stepped down, somehow ISIS would melt away, and that responsible rebels would turn against ISIS to finish them off.

More simply, Russia and Iran will not accept any jihadist victory in Syria. On this point it cannot back down, nor will Moscow let America decapitate the Syrian state. It seems that Kerry has grasped that for America to insist on the “Assad must go” policy simply implies inevitable war with Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. Perhaps it was this which finally persuaded Kerry that the policy must change.

A changed policy it does seem to be. More or less at the same time as Kerry spoke in Moscow, Vice President Joe Biden spoke by telephone with the Iraqi prime minister:

The Vice President noted the recent deployment of Turkish forces into northern Iraq had occurred without the prior consent of the Iraqi government. Both leaders welcomed initial indications of the withdrawal of some Turkish forces and agreed this should continue, reiterating that any foreign forces can only be present in Iraq with the coordination and permission of the Iraqi government. The Vice President reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to Iraqi sovereignty and territorial integrity and called on Turkey to do the same by withdrawing any military forces from Iraqi territory that have not been authorized by the Iraqi government.

In short, in a dramatic inversion of the NATO narrative that Turkey’s incursion into Iraq was justified, Biden just implied Turkey’s action was illegal, and called on Turkey to withdraw from Iraq. Not only that, but the U.S. has been insisting that Iraq close its border with Syria, and there are persistent rumors that Ahrar al-Sham will join Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS on the terrorist list being drawn up by Jordan.

But if indeed, as Kerry says, America has truly abandoned regime change in Damascus — then Ahrar al-Sham and al-Nusra being on the terrorist list makes sense. What would be the point of American and European intelligence services firing up these unpredictable, dangerous and brutal movements through their Turkish, Qatari and Saudi allies if Washington now understands that bringing down Assad will not only not help defeat ISIS (but rather the reverse), but also may imply war with Russia and Iran.

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A guard at Yamadi camp near the Bayirbucak district in Lattakia, Syria. (Photo by Emin Sansar/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)

Already, pro-interventionist critics have noted the wider strategic implications of such a policy change: Michael Young notes:

[It] puts the Saudis and Turks on the spot, as they are the ones who will have to convince the opposition to go along with a negotiating process that sets no timetable for Assad’s exit … [Neither] country [has] much of a choice, since any obstruction will be portrayed as undermining a settlement and aiding the jihadists. That is precisely why the Saudis took the lead in establishing an anti-ISIS Muslim coalition this week.

Equally, the logic of finally coming to the decision that Russia can be a partner in Syria would imply at least a partial rethink of the notion that Putin must be cornered and made to look weak. That, at least, is the logic. But as the doyen of America’s Russia specialists, Stephen Cohen, has noted, there is absolutely no support for détente with Russia, either in official Washington or in American think tanks. Cohen remarks that this state of hostility is worse than during the Cold War, when at least there was some support for détente.

Of course, the caveat emptor in all this is that Obama is subject to pressures within the U.S. (and from Gulf lobbyists). He has been able to walk back several attempts to engage America more fully in regime change in Damascus, but this shift will require him to be proactive, to put political capital on the table by persuading Congress to support any political settlement that may emerge. It is one thing to quietly frustrate plans for a no-fly zone through administrative passivity. It is another altogether to go out and campaign for a Syria policy which will see Assad remaining in his palace.

Will he — can he — make that step?

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Paris Attack Shows Why Al Qaeda Might Have Been Right About ISIS All Along

BEIRUT — At this point, there are important components to events which are not clear: Were the plans for the downing of the Russian airliner in Sinai, last week’s multiple suicide attacks in Beirut and the bombings in Paris, conceived within the Islamic State leadership and the operations executed according to the wishes and directions of the ISIS leadership in Raqqa or Mosul?

President François Hollande implied a connection to Raqqa, but gives no evidence. But if this indeed is so, and let us presume it is, it signals a major shift in strategy by ISIS. The consequences imply that the West may no longer be able to fend off acknowledging the Wahhabist origins of movements such as ISIS and Al Qaeda, nor ignore their umbilical connection to Saudi Arabia, which has succored them — even as the House of Saud now fears that its monstrous progeny is intent on “cleansing” Arabia of the Al Saud themselves, and returning it the pristine Wahhabism on which Saudi Arabia originally was founded — the “one, true Islam” that ISIS insists upon.

Al Qaeda is global, ephemeral and virtual, whereas ISIS is territorial.

In the wake of 9/11, the fact that 15 of the 19 attackers were Saudi citizens was airbrushed out from the landscape in favor of claims that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction — which Washington wished the world would focus on more. It will not be so easy to ignore the historic dimension now.

America may have to take a deep breath and fundamentally reconsider the nature of its alliances with the likes of Turkey and Saudi Arabia, which both openly proclaimed their intent, in Syria today, to go on aiding the gamut of these Caliphate forces (ISIS, Al Qaeda and Ahrar al-Sham). Recall that ordinary Syrians have been living Paris’ Friday terror on a daily basis, for five years now. It is hard to see how the West can continue its ambiguous game of footsie with such forces, in the wake of what may have happened in Sinai, in Beirut and Paris.

beirut bomb

The wife of one of the people killed in a twin bombing attack that rocked a busy shopping street in Beirut mourns. (MAHMOUD ZAYYAT/AFP/Getty Images)

So, what can have prompted this major strategic shift by ISIS? Well, there has always been one major point of dissent between Al Qaeda and ISIS: Al Qaeda’s leadership has said, openly, that it believes that ISIS had erred by proclaiming the Caliphate, the Islamic State. The ISIS proclamation was premature and the conditions were not propitious, Al Qaeda’s leaders stated.

Al Qaeda military operations focus on the “vexation and exhaustion” of America and its Western allies, which would eventually lead to an overextension of Western forces in many ways: morally, militarily, politically and economically. A reflection of this different approach to ISIS has been Al Qaeda’s willingness to work and cooperate with other insurgent forces in Syria; whereas ISIS rejects cooperation, demanding instead absolute allegiance and obedience.

ISIS opted for the absolute: an all out push to establish God’s “Principality” (a Caliphate), here and now, on physical territory, with borders, administration, Sharia law and a system of justice. The big difference between the two movements in effect, is “territoriality.” Al Qaeda is global, ephemeral and virtual, whereas ISIS is territorial.

It is too early to say that ISIS is collapsing — but a part of it may be.

But what if ISIS fears to lose this territoriality? Strange things are happening in Syria. Villages that have been held by ISIS for two years are falling to government forces in hours. Everywhere small gains are being made by the Syrian army or its allies, across contested areas. It is too early to say that ISIS is collapsing — but a part of it may be.

And if ISIS begins to lose its distinguishing feature — that it is a territorial power in Syria and Iraq — then perhaps its leadership might conclude that Ayman al-Zawahiri was right: Al Qaeda was right, and ISIS, if it faces losing its territoriality, must adopt Al Qaeda strategies (Al Qaeda has already called for a united stand with ISIS against the Russian and Iranian interventions in Syria).

But what, on the other hand, if this is not a strategic decision by the ISIS leadership, but rather that the bomb on the Russian aircraft and the suicide bombings in Beirut and Paris were spontaneous, copycat attacks by local elements and not conceived, ordered and operationally initiated in Raqqa or Mosul?

In this case, Europe has a different problem — but one no less serious. In some ways, the public evidence does not lean towards a Raqqa-led initiative. It leans the other way. From what we know to date, all of those involved in the Paris attacks were European citizens. In short, it was a case of European on European war. It is not clear that any of the perpetrators were returnees from the conflict in Syria (the authenticity of the Syrian passport found at the scene has been questioned).

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Debris of the A321 Russian airliner on the ground a day after the plane crashed in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. (KHALED DESOUKI/AFP/Getty Images)

And if there was no direct order from the ISIS command, there is prima facie in Europe, a shadow Al Qaeda-like structure taking shape: the attacks in Paris were well-planned, prepared and executed. The claims of responsibility are not definitive: there have been examples where Islamic leaderships have accepted responsibility and claimed an attack even when they did not order it — and whereby claiming it, severely damaged the movement.

Robert Fisk has noted:

Omar Ismail Mostafai, one of the suicide killers in Paris, was of Algerian origin — and so, too, may be other named suspects. Said and Cherif Kouachi, the brothers who murdered the Charlie Hebdo journalists, were also of Algerian parentage. They came from the five million-plus Algerian community in France, for many of whom the Algerian war never ended, and who live today in the slums of Saint-Denis and other Algerian banlieues of Paris.

If this is so then not just France, but other European states, too, will need to take a deep breath and wonder how their policies have metamorphosed, from ostensible multiculturalism, into a “soft apartheid” in which Europe’s Muslim citizens feel the discrimination and contempt of many of their fellow citizens. European leaders cannot simply ignore the historic context in which Algerian Muslims (rightly or wrongly) feel their Sunni world to be in crisis: with Sunnis standing marginalized, with the feeling that Sunni power is being usurped. Or, that an Algerian can say “Je suis aujourd’hui Syrien,” just as a Briton or any other European may be saying “I am Paris today.” Bombing Raqqa will not resolve this — if indeed, that is what lies behind the Paris bombings.

This is not to justify, but rather it is to lament how shy we have become towards clear-sightedness. Puritan Wahhabism was born at a time of an earlier Muslim crisis. It sought to cleanse Islam by fire and the sword — from all the decadence and idolatry that had accrued to it. And today, with European Sunni Muslims in a fresh crisis, it is the same Puritan call which issues out from the mosques of Paris and London, and from many dedicated television stations — funded by our Saudi and Gulf “allies.”

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Why Russia Perceives Syria as Its Front Line

BEIRUT — Russia believes that it sees the situation of the Middle East very plainly. Vladimir Putin sees nation-states across the region weakening and eroding: Iraq fractured, Syria in conflict, Lebanon without a state, Yemen in anarchy, Libya in chao…

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Russia’s Aim in Syria Is to Strategically Defeat ISIS and Al Qaeda

BEIRUT — As soon as Russia launched the first stages of its military campaign in Syria, world media erupted with epic slights on President Vladimir Putin and the deprecation of Russia’s strategic motives in Syria. Is this information operation simply a recrudescence of Cold War neuralgia, or is there something more profound at work here?

One can see, too, that the U.S. administration’s response to Russia’s initiative has oscillated uncertainly. Initially, Washington took a “business as usual approach,” suggesting that it and its allies’ air campaign would proceed unchanged. But the administration then seemed blindsided by the speed and extent of the Russian action. Last week, a Russian official arrived at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad to announce the immediate start to the Russian air operation in Syria, and to insist that the U.S. keep its aircraft (and personnel) out of Syrian airspace altogether that day. Since then, the Russian tempo of air attacks has been impressive, leaving little or no space to others.

Clearly, “business as usual” in these circumstance was impractical (if some calamitous air incident in the Syrian skies was to be avoided). And President Obama’s opponents immediately pounced: Putin was wrong-footing America (again). Secretary of State John Kerry hotly demanded military coordination that would at least keep the U.S. coalition flying — and in the game.

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In this photo made from footage taken from Russian Defense Ministry official website on Oct. 1, a bomb explosion is seen in Syria. (AP Photo/ Russian Defense Ministry Press Service)

The second approach has been to try wrest at least the political initiative back into American hands — by conceding to Russia its military role — whilst trying to set parameters (essentially President Bashar al-Assad’s removal), that would require a major reworking of the Syrian leadership, in which America would have a major say. (Britain and France similarly lifted a leg, to mark their territory of having a claim in any final outcome, too.)

During all these maneuvers and rhetorical skirmishing, however, the U.S. has also been quietly re-positioning itself towards the political settlement which it now sees as coming somewhat into focus. In London and Berlin, Secretary Kerry modified the U.S.’s initial absolute objection to President Assad remaining in office: Now, he said, Assad might remain for a transitional phase, however long that might be, “or whatever,” adding that ultimately this was for the Syrian people to determine (see our last Weekly Comment). On Wednesday, Kerry went further, and said something equally significant: Exiting his discussions with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Kerry said that Syria must remain “united … [and] be secular.” This represents a huge (if barely remarked) shift: It cuts the ground from under the Muslim Brotherhood as well as the jihadists — in fact, from all Islamists who cannot accept a secular state, which, to be clear, effectively removes pretty well all the Gulf protégés from having any significant slice of the cake.

No doubt, Lavrov had made it plain to Kerry that Assad has told the Russians that he is open to political change and to reform (and that Russia believes him). But perhaps Lavrov also explained why the particular historical circumstances of Syria voided any prospect of a Brotherhood insertion into government being a workable prospect. In any event, Kerry changed tune.

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Members of Free Syrian Army make preparations before attacking an Assad regime forces’ base in East Ghouta, Damascus. (Ammar Al Bushy/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)

The third U.S. tactic seems to be “containment” — that old standby: a massive information war is underway to suggest that the Russians committed themselves only to attack ISIS, and nobody else (when Russia never made any such undertaking). Lavrov is explicit: Russia is targeting ISIS and “other terrorist groups,” as they had always “said they would do.” Nonetheless, the info war campaign continues in order to put pressure on Russia, and to contain its military campaign. American officials have been on record saying that “moderates” turned out to be as rare as mythical unicorns amongst the Syrian armed opposition, and that only “four or five” were in the field now — and yet suddenly it seems that there are all these “moderate CIA trainees” under attack now. In fact, there are no “moderate jihadists.” The term is an oxymoron: there are only jihadists who are more — or less — close to ISIS or al Qaeda. It is a parsing of definitions that simply does not interest Russia.

Tom Friedman puts a somewhat different gloss on events from his well-briefed perspective: Let Putin and his allies have a go at defeating ISIS (and good luck to them). But when they fail, and find the Sunni world has turned against them, then they (the Russians) will need a ladder out of the tree, which only Washington will be able to lend, to help Putin recover from his strategic mistake. This is too reductive. Putin well understands the difference between traditional Sunni Islam in the Levant and the very recent blow-in of militant Gulf Wahhabism, which is at odds with this traditional Sunni Islam of Syria and Iraq. He knows, too, that many Sunnis still hold to the notion of citizenship within a secular, or non-sectarian state; and that Syria and Iraq are both inheritors to venerable, old civilizations (Greater Syria and Mesopotamia); each with their own political cultures and visions. The fight against contemporary orientations of Wahhabism has never been the reductive struggle between a Shia minority (the Alawites) and a Sunni majority; it is as much a struggle to preserve the Levantine tradition against a foreign (Gulf) culture, Wahhabism, floated into the region on a tide of petrodollars.

Why should President Putin understand this cultural war better than Western leaders? It is because Orthodox Christianity (of Russia) never entertained the Western binary opposition between the Roman Christianity and Islam. Orthodox Christianity and traditional Sunni Islam share many attributes together, and have a history of close relations.

There are no ‘moderate jihadists.’ The term is an oxymoron: there are only jihadists who are more — or less — close to ISIS or al Qaeda. It is a parsing of definitions that simply does not interest Russia.

So what are the Russians doing? Firstly, they are running through a “bank” of “terrorist” targets assembled by Syrian, Russian, Iranian and Hezbollah intelligence services. It is unlikely that this phase will last long — and then, the mode will smartly change. With the primary targets destroyed, the ground offensive will begin, led by the Syrian army (with direct support from Hezbollah, and with advice from Russian and Iranian officers). What will be different now, however, is that the ground forces will have the benefit of all-weather and nighttime air support, plus real-time imagery. Whilst Russian soldiers will not be directly involved in boots-on-the-ground operations in support of the Syrian army, Russian forces will be directly involved in securing a safe area around their air base near Latakia. To the extent that this keeps Latakia secure, it will as a byproduct, free up the Syrian army from the need to station troops there, thus making them available for other tasks.

For now, the Russians seem (as evidenced by their airstrikes) to be intent firstly on eliminating any hostile threats adjacent to their forces in the area of Latakia (the Russian air base is located some 20 miles south of Latakia). This is standard military modus operandi. Their secondary and tertiary objectives seem to be to secure the M4 highway between Latakia and Aleppo (targeting pockets of insurgent forces adjacent to the highway), and in striking insurgent-held areas along the M5 highway.

There is nothing political behind such strikes — in the sense of strengthening one insurgent group in opposition to any other. It seems, rather, very clear that the Russians are preparing for the subsequent ground sweep by the Syrian army: the Russian air force is securing lines of logistic support to the Syrian army, and concomitantly denying those same lines to the jihadists. It is, in short, all rather military — and in line with what Russia says are its objectives.

So, why this flood tide of snide commentary, disinformation and claims of a covert, “underhand” Russian strategy? What is it that so irks the West? Well, of course, one part of it is that Putin has put Washington on the spot, and made the West’s claims to have been fighting ISIS for the last year to appear hollow. But there may be more to it than this.

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The Syrian border town of Kobani after U.S.-led coalition airstrikes against the Islamic State. (Halil Fidan/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)

For the past few decades, NATO effectively made all the decisions about war and peace. It faced no opposition and no rival. Matters of war were effectively a solely internal debate within NATO — about whether to proceed or not, and in what way. That was it. It didn’t matter much about what others thought or did. Those on the receiving end simply had to endure it. But whilst its destructive powers were evident, its strategic benefits have been far from evident — especially across the Middle East.

What probably irks the West most is that Russia has unfolded — and begun — a sophisticated military campaign in the flash of an eye. NATO bumbles along much more slowly with its complicated structures. Iraqis have long complained that in military terms, assistance promised by the NATO powers takes (literally) years to materialize, whereas requests to Russia and Iran are expeditiously met. So Tom Friedman’s condescension towards the Russian military intervention does have more than a whiff of orientalism to it.

But all the hoo-ha probably stems also from the sense that this Russian initiative could mark the coming into birth of something more serious — of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a putative military alliance. Admittedly, the “4+1 alliance” — Russia, Iran, Syria and Iraq, plus Hezbollah — is not branded as SCO (and the coalition partners do not overlap with SCO membership), but the 4+1 alliance venture might well yet prove to be a “pilot” in non-Western, successful coalition-operating. Furthermore, its objective is precisely to preempt NATO-style regime change projects — a prime SCO concern. This prospect certainly would irk the Western security establishment — and would potentially change many an existing NATO calculus.

Not surprisingly, then, it might be seen in some Western quarters as hugely important to set a narrative of failure for the 4+1 alliance, and to denigrate any sense that its military example might have strategic importance for the non-Western world.

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